Global imbalances or Financial regulatory failures

月曜日のglobal financial securityの授業用のプレゼン準備。（おもに）中国の経常黒字に由来する global imbalanceがfinancial crisisに与えた影響について。まともにプレゼンしようと思ったら、国際マクロをもう少しまじめに勉強しないといけないのだが、残念ながらその時間もないので、幾分（相当？）お茶を濁し気味の内容…。コメントいただければ幸いです。
========================

The world became significantly much more leveraged over the past five years. And it was leverage taken on without foresight due to misplaced compensation incentives. This all came crashing down in the financial crisis, and the actions of so many during this time now look so, so foolish.

これは、S. Dadidoffというエコノミストが今月5日にNYT.comに載せた記事の一節であるが、今般の金融危機についての、世の中の標準的な見方から、そう離れてはいないと言えるだろう。問題は、ここまで大規模なbubbleが発生した原因は何だったのか、という点である。

　　

これについて、Maurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (October 2009) は、

Controversy remains about the precise connection between global imbalances and the global financial meltdown. Some commentators argue that external imbalances had little or nothing to do with the crisis, which instead was the result of financial regulatory failures and policy errors, mainly on the part of the U.S. Others put forward various mechanisms through which global imbalances are claimed to have played a prime role in causing the financial collapse.

と述べている。後者の意見は、よりストレート（或いは「より感情的」？）に言えば、“the global financial crisis was caused by hardworking Chinese factory workers who committed the sin of over-saving, which created a glut of money that needed to be invested”（Simon Johnson and James Kwak）ということになるのかもしれない。（※ なお、Johnson & Kwakの本当の主張はこの真逆のもの）

たとえば、Financial Timesは、Krishna Guhaという記者による今年1月1日付の記事（“Paulson says crisis sown by imbalance”）の中で、以下のように報じている。

The US Treasury Secretary said that in the years leading up to the crisis, super-abundant savings from fast-growing emerging nations such as China and oil exporters – at a time of low inflation and booming trade and capital flows – put downward pressure on yields and risk spreads everywhere. This, he said, laid the seeds of a global credit bubble that extended far beyond the US sub-prime mortgage market and has now burst with devastating consequences worldwide.

一方、同じ記者が今年9月17日付の記事（“China scorns focus on imbalances” ）で報じているところでは、中国側は、この一件に対し、以下のような反論を試みている。

Zhou Wenzhong, China’s ambassador in Washington, said: “People should not focus on only one thing, that is balancing the economy.” The International Monetary Fund should concentrate on doing a better job of monitoring the build-up of financial risks.

Imbalances were “certainly not the root cause of the problem”, Mr Zhou said. “The root cause of the crisis is the lack of supervision and abuse of the openness of the market, very risky levels of leverage and too much speculation.”

China is likely to argue that it is already doing a substantial amount to rebalance its economy. Although imports and exports have both slumped this year, imports have fared less badly as a result of demand for commodities created by the government’s fiscal stimulus programme.

このグラフからも見て取れるように、2000年代半ば以降、中国（とドイツと日本。実際には産油国も）の経常黒字は明らかに急拡大している。その結果、膨らみに膨らんだ中国（とその他の国々）の貯金（saving）が、アメリカの市場に過剰な流動性を供給し続けたこと、また、その過剰流動性が、アメリカのinterest ratesを実態以上に低い水準にとどめ、資産バブルを発生させるのに、少なくとも一役買ったことは、明らかであろう。論点は、その影響がどの程度決定的だったのか、という点である。この点については、今の時点で結論めいたものがあるわけではない。（というか、僕のような国際マクロ素人からしてみれば、どっちがよりcriticalな要因だったかなんて、どこまで議論を尽くしてみても、結局、見方次第で、どちらにでも見えてしまうのではないかという気さえする。と言いながら、自分の不勉強の正当化を試みていることは否定しえないが…）。

というわけで、簡単に結論の出る話でもないので、あとは、両派の識者の皆さんの意見を紹介して（お茶を濁して）おこうと思う。

◆「global imbalances = 真因」説◆

“Imbalances a reason for concern”　Free exchange at Economist.com, October 7, 2009

One shouldn't underplay the effect of rising commodity prices on the global economy, and those price increases were driven in part by the factors shaping imbalances. On the one hand, low interest rates drove investors seeking returns to invest in commodities, and on the other hand, rapid export-oriented growth in China contributed to rising global demand for resources, pushing up prices. Without the commodity price shock, the recession and financial crisis would likely have been less severe.
... an undervalued Chinese currency reduced the return to investment in tradeables in America, and increased the return to investment in non-tradeable sectors, particularly housing.

また、2005年には、Bernankeもこんなことを言っている。前掲のMaurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (October 2009) より。

In his famous Sandridge Lecture of March 10, 2005, Ben Bernanke argued that the causes of the U.S. foreign deficit, and therefore its cures, were primarily external to the U.S. ...  Bernanke did note that “the risk of a disorderly adjustment in financial markets always exists, and the appropriately conservative approach for policymakers is to be on guard for any such developments.”

◆ anti-「global imbalances = 真因」説◆

“Don't Blame China” Simon Johnson and James Kwak at Washington Post.com, October 6, 2009

While Chinese over-saving was a contributing factor to the recent crisis, it was neither necessary nor sufficient. ... The problem is what we did with the cheap money.

In short, we had a dysfunctional financial system that failed at its most fundamental job -- allocating capital to where it benefits the economy the most.　Encouraging productive investment by businesses and preventing the next bubble go hand in hand -- both require fixing the financial system. Blaming global imbalances -- a consequence bereft of either a subject (an actor) or a verb (an action) -- is only a way of avoiding our real problems.

ちなみに、先にも引用したMaurice Obstfeld and Kenneth Rogoff (October 2009) ―これは、サンフランシスコ連銀のAsia Economic Policy Conferenceのために用意されたものであるが―は、結局のところ、以下のような、中庸めいた見識を示している。

We too believe that the global imbalances and the financial crisis are intimately connected, but we take a more nuanced stance on the nature of the connections. In our view, both of these phenomena have their origins primarily in economic policies followed in a number of countries in the 2000s (including the United States) and in distortions that influenced the transmission of these policies through financial markets. The United States’ ability to finance macroeconomic imbalances through easy foreign borrowing allowed it to postpone tough policy choices (something that was of course true in many other deficit countries as well). Not only was the U.S. able to borrow in dollars at nominal interest rates kept low by a loose monetary policy. Also, until around the autumn of 2008, exchange-rate and other asset-price movements kept U.S. net foreignliabilities growing at a rate far below the cumulative U.S. current account deficit. On the lending side, China’s ability to sterilize the immense reserve purchases it placed in U.S.
markets allowed it to maintain an undervalued currency and postpone rebalancing its own economy. Had seemingly easy postponement options not been available, the subsequent
crisis might well have been mitigated, if not contained.

Starbucks Coffee, Washington DC, Oct 31, 18:07